ZimEye Editorial: The End of a Captured Revolution in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s war veterans have finally come to a painful realization: their liberation project was captured—long ago, and right under their noses.

A monster grew out of what was meant to be a people’s revolution. That monster has destroyed not only the country and its institutions, but also the very political party that once united the two liberation armies.

Now, something must be done—and urgently.

Across the border in South Africa, we are seeing the emergence of Jacob Zuma’s MK party—a grassroots, black liberation movement. But in Zimbabwe, a similar formation is rising with far more momentum and urgency. Unlike South Africa’s MK, which may take years to enter government, Zimbabwe’s new movement could assume power in a matter of days.

This is all happening amid a growing body of evidence that Emmerson Mnangagwa was never a liberator. He was, and remains, an infiltrator—clearly handled by the Rhodesian Special Branch to sabotage the liberation effort from within. By 1980, according to multiple official disclosures, Zimbabwe’s post-independence button is supposed to be reset. After the Lancaster House Agreement and the 1980 elections, the plan was to re-establish a law-and-order concern that can be spinned back to yesteryear with a single button.

—the operator would be a criminal who by then is or was supposed to have eliminated true liberators like Herbert Chitepo, Josiah Tongogara, and even Robert Mugabe. The result is what we now see: Zimbabwe run as a Rhodesian-style “Law and Order” concern, under Mnangagwa.

Next week, starting Monday, the regime is expected to block protests in urban areas. Mnangagwa will likely respond with threats and provocation. This could quickly spiral into violence, pushing the country toward a Rwanda-like scenario. Fear, hopelessness, and provocation—not just military force—could catalyze the violence.

In such a volatile environment, communities may turn on one another. Revenge attacks may erupt within villages, locations, and townships. Government installations and police stations could face petrol bombings. A COVID-style lockdown may be imposed, but it will not stop the chaos.

As retaliation from Mnangagwa’s supporters intensifies, a cycle of violence will feed itself. The army may hesitate to act—not because it lacks capacity, but because ZIPRA elements now in command of the military fear being accused of launching a coup on behalf of ZAPU or ZANU. That political paralysis could cost Zimbabwe precious time and lives.

But eventually, the demand for decisive action will become overwhelming. Once the masses—and liberation war veterans from both ZANLA and ZIPRA—call on the army to intervene, it will likely act in order to save lives and the state itself.

At that point, ZANU-PF may not survive. A new political configuration may emerge—perhaps something akin to South Africa’s MK Party, built on a genuine ZIPRA-ZANLA coalition.

This moment could be Zimbabwe’s worst tragedy—or its best opportunity. Out of the rubble, the country might finally begin to work again.- ZimEye

⸻