The Government of Zimbabwe launched the Political Actors Dialogue (PAD) on 17 May 2019. The stated goal of the process is to improve the country’s socio-economic fortunes whilst fostering tolerance and an inclusive democratic culture. It comprises seventeen (17) political parties with one conspicuous absentee, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Nelson Chamisa. The MDC and its supporters have consistently dismissed POLAD as insincere, ineffectual and disingenuous. In this post, I evaluate the criticism of the POLAD process in the context of Zimbabwe’s recent political history.
1. Exclusionary Nature of the Process
The most recurring criticism of POLAD has been the absence of the MDC. Some have questioned the efficacy of a process which does not include the country’s biggest opposition party. The absence of the MDC means the views of a significant number of Zimbabweans will be excluded, thereby undermining the credibility and legitimacy of the process. For this reason, South Africa’s ambassador to Zimbabwe, His Excellency Mphakama Mbete, underscored the need for the process to be inclusive and representative. Indeed, it would be inexcusable if the process lacks tangible outcomes and is only meant to bolster President Mnangagwa’s image as a unifying statesman.
However, the absence of the MDC is not by exclusion. They were invited andrejected the offer. Thus, Ambassador Mphakama Mbete also urged all parties to join POLAD. In other words, the process was not designed to be exclusionary. Instead, it is the MDC which found it too broad and inclusive. Nelson Chamisa argues that as the only political actor disputing Emmerson Mnangagwa’s legitimacy, he must be the sole party to dialogue with the incumbent. By this logic, the process need not be more inclusive, but be made exclusive to ZANU PF and the MDC.
It is demonstrably false to claim that Nelson Chamisa is the only political actor with an electoral dispute with Emmerson Mnangagwa. If anything, he is the only politician who was willing to pursue that dispute in a judicial forum. Whilst Chamisa has persisted with confrontation, his peers have opted for conversation; substituting embroilment with engagement. Therefore, it is counter-intuitive to argue that willingness to dialogue must itself be the basis for the removal of such actors from the dialogue process in favour of those questioning the legitimacy of the incumbent.
The MDC emerged from a broad coalition of working people, civil society and other groups. In spite of the eclectic nature of its origins, the MDC has operated with a high degree of secrecy and exclusivity in both the negotiations leading to the 18th Amendment of the Lancaster House Constitution and those in terms of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). In both instances, calls for inclusion from civil society were ignored and the MDC even berated the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) for opposing the constitution-making process.
Given this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the MDC finds the POLAD process too inclusive. They believe in the sufficiency of their own participation to the exclusion of other political and civil society players.
This is one of the underlying drivers for the proliferation of political parties in Zimbabwe – the primacy of political party formations in national processes. Ten years ago, the NCA could only protest from the margins as a civic organisation. Now that it is a political party, it is part of the dialogue process and has left the business of boycotts to the MDC. National processes are seldom halted by the non-participation of one political player. Just as the COPAC process continued in spite of the boycott by the country’s biggest constitutional pressure group, the POLAD process has forged ahead in spite of spirited opposition from the MDC.
2. Legitimacy and Democratic Mandate
Alex Magaisa argues against the dialogue process as follows;
The fact of the matter is that none of these people has a democratic mandate to assume the role they are claiming. They do not represent anyone because not only are they are unelected but they have no significant vote to their name.
In other words, dialogue is only legitimate if conducted among elected representatives. This mistakenly conflates electability with the capacity to govern. Optimal governance choices are not the exclusive preserve of the elected. Elected officials have an important constitutionally delineated function which is not mutually exclusive with the proffering of alternate models of governance. The Constitution of Zimbabwe recognizes this by allowing the President to appoint up to five unelected members of cabinet.
In the United States, the less popular third parties have advocated for pertinent matters excluded from the national debate including opposition to slavery, the women’s suffragette movement and child labour laws.
Locally, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) led the effort against the one-party state in spite of securing only two seats in the 1990 general elections. It is abundantly clear that optimal ideas do not fester only among the elected/electable.
Consider the following contradiction; the MDC maintains that the 2018 elections were not free and fair and so Emmerson Mnangagwa is not the legitimate President of Zimbabwe. Conversely, they insist the figures from that disputed election entitle them to preferential treatment as the country’s main opposition party. This is the art of having your cake and eating it. If the 2018 election results are to be considered, then one must come to terms with Mnangagwa’s victory ahead of claiming first position among the losers. If those results remain disputed, then it is reasonable for all political parties to be ranked equally pending a credible election result to set them apart. Just like the CODESA process in South Africa, all parties would then participate in creating the environment for an election with an undisputed outcome.
The undue emphasis on representative capacity seems misinformed by the 2008 negotiations in which all parties represented in parliament were also parties to the negotiations. In fact, that process was informed more by legislative rather thanrepresentative capacity. There could be no legislative outcome from the talks without the two MDC’s since they held a slim majority in the lower house. Representative capacity would have meant that Simba Makoni’s impressive 8.3% of the national vote would have secured him a seat at the negotiating table. Yet he had no legislative capacity and thus no leverage. In the current scenario, and in spite of their parliamentary representation, the MDC has very limited legislative capacity.
Like all the political parties represented at POLAD, they cannot block any legislation by ZANU PF including constitutional amendments, let alone pass their own legislation. This severely encumbers their ability to set the terms for any dialogue process or distinguish themselves from other political parties save by reference to figures from the same election whose result they continue to dispute.
3. Independent Mediator
The MDC has demanded an independent and mutually acceptable mediator. In the past, a mediator has been selected with some regional or international backing. South Africa was appointed mediator by SADC in 2007 whilst Britain facilitated the 1979 process in terms of a mandate from the Commonwealth Heads of States and Governments. Since the 2018 elections were largely endorsed as credible, there is no such regional/international backing for a mediator. This means the parties would need to create consensus over both the need for and choice of a mediator.
Past experience suggests that there is no mediator who is ever truly independent. Lord Carrington deftly protected white settler interests in 1979 whilst the South African mediators were repeatedly accused of pro-ZANU PF bias. The Motlanthe report was the latest iteration of the complexity in trying to secure independent arbiters from abroad.
4. Undermining Parliament
Magaisa fears the dialogue process will undermine Parliament.
More importantly, as a forum of interaction between the ruling party and the opposition on public affairs, the Polad is beginning to assume the role of an institution that is parallel to Parliament, except that it consists of the ruling party and the unelected.
It is not apparent how dialogue with a member of the executive amounts to assuming the role of the legislature. Neither is it clear how those without any votes in parliament can assume or subsume its role. As already highlighted, many noble causes have been championed outside of formal state institutions. In circumstances where Parliament is established for elected officials, it is reasonable to establish a more inclusive platform outside parliament to influence policy formulation. This does not circumvent the legislative process. Increasing the number of voices in the democratic conversation is not inimical to democracy.
5. Solving the Economic Crisis
Everybody agrees that the economy urgently needs to improve. Whilst some believe the panacea lay in better ideas, others repose their trust in particularindividuals. Magaisa argues that the economic problems are tied to ZANU PF’s failure to secure the loser’s consent after their victory. Yet the MDC has always argued that ZANU PF cannot manage the economy due to corruption and incompetence. Put differently, the moribund economic has more to do with the victor’s ineptitude than the loser’s consent or kudira jecha. If the country needs better ideas, then POLAD is an important opportunity for such technocrats as Nkosana Moyo to influence government policy. On the other hand, if it is onlyNelson Chamisa and the MDC who possess the keys to unlocking the economy’s potential, then there is little value in engaging the broad swath of Zimbabwean political parties.
6. Conclusion
If in previous post I was accused of blindness to politics, in this instance it is my singular focus. Opposition to the POLAD process has more to do with the politics of entry and exit than the value of discussing issues and ideas. It is concerned with the who and not the how; hence the emphasis on the legitimacy of the incumbent and those invited to the process. Imagine if fortunes were reversed and the MDC had won the 2018 elections with a two thirds majority in parliament; would they likely cajole ZANU PF to a dialogue process even if ZANU PF rejected the MDC’s claim of legitimacy? Such an outcome is highly unlikely given the treatment of the last high profile member of the opposition to question their leader’s legitimacy: Dr. Thokozani Khupe. Yet somehow, what leads to party expulsion internally is expected to justify exclusive dialogue nationally. Ultimately, every platform must be used to try improve the dire situation in the country and the courage to confront must not preclude exchange of ideas with those with a willingness to converse.
-www.davidhofisi.blogspot.com