By Dr. Phillan Zamchiya. 11-10-2023.

Dear Reader,

Should the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) led by Nelson Chamisa withdraw from parliament as a way to protest and demand a democratic order in the context of deepening authoritarianism in Zimbabwe?

Reader, answering this complex question requires a deduction based on reasoning and evidence and not just on emotional flares hence my proposed framework for thought.

In my humble view, the decision to withdraw must be informed by at least five primary factors.

First, is a data driven assessment of regime vulnerability with legitimacy as one variable. High vulnerability locally, regionally and internationally [The West and The East] points to a high probability of regime failure in the context of disengagement. The logic is that a strong regime is more likely to ignore the withdrawal. On the other hand, a weak regime is likely to buckle under pressure and consider some reforms when faced with a ‘boycott’. If there is low regime vulnerability, a strategic temporary retreat for opposition preservation cannot be entirely off the table.

Second, is an evidence-based conclusion that participation in parliament is no longer tenable for an opposition Member of Parliament (MP) to discharge their three primary constitutional duties due to regime intransigence. There will be little reason to stay in parliament if an elected MP is no longer able to: (a) play a representative role that is to air the views of those who elected them and engage in debates that give value to the citizens’ needs; (b) supervise the work of the executive and other institutions and agencies of government and (c) make democratic laws for the good governance of Zimbabwe. Another consideration is whether the regime needs opposition representation in the legislature to function, for example, to make parliamentary committees work, pass bills and the budget.

Third, is a survey of the degree of internal universal acceptance for the uncharted territory of total disengagement within the CCC. In the absence of consensus within the CCC this can erode intra-party cohesion. The danger is to trigger elite defections to a potential formation with a counter view of continued participation. As a result, this will defeat the opposition goal of total delegitimization of parliament as a pariah one-party state platform.

Fourth, is an assessment of CCC’s capacity to trigger a regime crisis and the related political costs. Reader, one established rule of ending authoritarian regimes is triggering a crisis. A crisis here refers to mass demonstrations, strikes, petitions, stay aways, everyday forms of resistance, et cetera that are exercised peacefully. Elsewhere such actions have led to different outcomes such as: the massacre and decimation of the opposition and its prominent activists; breakdown of some authoritarian regimes and concessions for democratic reforms.

Fifth, is a solid plan for the costs of backing down from a public political fight in the event of no results as a worst case scenario. For withdrawal cannot be a permanent condition.

Reader, this is important because where ‘disengagements’ are common in the Middle-East the results are varied. Some resulted in democratic reforms, others led to more autocratic rules; some got favourable responses, others were totally ignored; some triggered regime change as in Cote d’Ivoire in 2000, while others led to consolidation of authoritarian rule and left the regime in an even stronger position and the opposition much weaker.