With China’s help,
a new city is taking shape on the outskirts of Zimbabwe’s capital Harare, as
Beijing deepens its influence in Africa.
A US$140 million
six-storey parliament building being constructed on Mount Hampden, about 18km
(11 miles) northwest of Harare, is the linchpin of a move by the southern
African country to ease congestion in the crowded capital.
Sitting on the top
of a hill, the imposing circular complex being erected by China’s Shanghai
Construction Group is fully paid by Beijing, which regards the gesture as a
donation.
The 33,000 square
metre (355,209 square foot) complex will replace the current 100-seat,
colonial-era building which Zimbabwean officials consider too small for the
country’s 350 legislators.
Besides the
parliament, the Zimbabwean government also plans to relocate some of its
administrative units, including its judiciary and executive branches, to the
site, where a state house and official residences for the speaker of the House
of Assembly and president of the Senate also will be built.
The new city will
also become home to the country’s reserve bank, upmarket suburbs, hotels and
shopping malls.
Zimbabwean
President Emmerson Mnangagwa has made three visits to the site since its
groundbreaking last year. During his latest visit on November 27, Mnangagwa
expressed appreciation to China for the donation.
“The building is
important in the decolonisation of Zimbabwe,” he said. It is expected to be
completed by March 2021.
Paying for the
construction of grandiose symbols of the state, such as presidential palaces
and parliamentary buildings, through grants or interest-free loans, has been
one of Beijing’s major diplomatic strategies on the continent.
When China first
started establishing diplomatic relations with Africa between the 1950s and
1970s, it used offers of financial help and interest-free loans and sent over
medical teams to endear itself to African countries.
In return, those
nations helped Beijing secure a seat on the United Nations Security Council in
1971. Until then the seat had been occupied by the Republic of China government
seated in Taiwan.
But it was the
construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara), Beijing’s most ambitious
and expensive project, that did the most to boost China’s political capital on
the continent.
The railway, which
was built between 1970 and 1975 for US$500 million via an interest-free loan to
be repaid over 30 years, necessitated the deployment of 25,000 Chinese workers.
Once completed, the line stretched almost 1,870km from Dar es Salaam Port to the
Zambian town of Kapiri Mposhi, where the country’s coal mines are situated.
Beijing has since
funded several projects, including soccer stadiums, in nations such as
Cameroon, Mozambique, Malawi, Ghana, Angola and Zambia. It has also paid for
parliamentary buildings in the Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Mozambique and
Sierra Leone. Further, China has gifted presidential palaces to countries such
as Togo, Sudan, Burundi and Guinea-Bissau.
The trend has
picked up recently with Beijing bankrolling the building of the US$200 million
African Union headquarters in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
Also, last year,
Beijing said it would fund the building of the new headquarters for the
Economic Community of West African States in Abuja, Nigeria, for US$31.6
million.
Meanwhile, China is
building a US$58 million parliamentary complex in the Republic of Congo and
rebuilding the burnt parliament in Gabon.
Two weeks ago,
Zambia announced that China has agreed to fund construction of a new
international conference centre that will be used to host the African Union
Heads of State Summit in 2022.
During the 2018
Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing, Chinese President
Xi Jinping pledged to extend US$60 billion in financing to Africa over three
years.
That will include
US$15 billion in grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, US$20
billion in credit lines, the setting up of a US$10 billion special fund for
development financing and a US$5 billion special fund for financing imports
from Africa.
China is the
continent’s largest bilateral lender, pouring billions of dollars into African
countries for the building of motorways, dams and railways under the Belt and
Road Initiative, the multibillion-dollar plan to link Asian and European
economies to a China-centred trading network.
China advanced more
than US$143 billion between 2000 and 2017, according to figures from the China
Africa Research Initiative at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies in Washington. Chinese aid to Africa stood at US$29.4
billion between 2003 and 2017, the figures showed.
Dr Obert Hodzi, an
international relations scholar at the University of Liverpool, said these
infrastructure “gifts” were meant to show China’s benevolence, its willingness
to share its prosperity with other developing countries and its sacrificial
giving that has endeared it to African leaders since the Tazara railway.
These gifts, he
said, also allowed Beijing to re-emphasise the tangible and much-needed
infrastructure benefits it provided to African economies – differentiating it
from Western powers that focus on “intangible issues of governance and human
rights” widely seen as disruptive by the ruling elites in Uganda, Zimbabwe and
Zambia.
“Currently, the
strategy is working,” Hodzi said. “[President Yoweri] Museveni has recently
praised the Chinese for not being jealous of Uganda and caring about its
development. Beijing also hopes that recipient governments will reciprocate by
favouring Chinese businesses.”
David Shinn, an
American diplomat and adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Elliott
School of International Affairs, said China’s practice of building, at no
charge, the African Union headquarters, regional African organisation
headquarters, presidential palaces, military headquarters, public stadiums and
political party headquarters was “brilliant public relations and probably buys
a great deal of influence with African governments, regional organisations and
the general public”.
But he questioned
whether African leaders really believed the projects involved no quid pro quo,
as Chinese diplomats often claim. If so, they were mistaken, he said.
“African leaders
can be excused for taking no interest in Chinese internal issues such as human
rights, the treatment of Uygurs in Xinjiang, the situation in Tibet, the
building of islands in the South China Sea and the status of Hong Kong,” Shinn
said.
“But a surprising
number of African governments are supporting China’s position on these
policies. That is where the quid pro quo comes into play.”
Stephen Chan, a
professor of world politics at the University of London’s School of Oriental
and African Studies, said China built prestige projects internationally.
“They sit alongside
the infrastructure projects – roads, railways – for which China is well known,”
he said.
“But they are not
as expensive. In a way, it is visibility for less outlay. It also gives
exposure to Chinese construction firms. For China, it is a win-win situation.”
But critics have
questioned the motives behind China’s largesse. Last year, a French
newspaper Le Monde claimed
Beijing was spying on the African Union (AU), saying it had installed hidden
microphones in the building and was taping sensitive information.
Beijing dismissed
the report’s “groundless accusations”, while the AU called them “baseless”Analysts
say China’s efforts to gift imposing projects is part of its broader chequebook
diplomacy programme in Africa to win the affection and allegiance of its elite.
Bradley Parks,
executive director of AidData, a research lab at the College of William and
Mary in the US state of Virginia, said Beijing often plied African leaders with
lavish spending on projects, such as stadiums, theatres, museums and
parliamentary buildings, that disproportionately benefited urban elites.
Beijing’s purpose
was partly to secure African countries’ support for its policy positions such
as its opposition to the South China Sea arbitration process at the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague and its adherence to a “one-China” policy on
Taiwan, he said.
Parks was part of a
team that recently published an AidData paper showing that Chinese aid was used
either to buy African governments’ support for its foreign policy or as a
reward for them providing it.
“Across the
continent, we find that there is a strong, positive, and statistically
significant relationship between Chinese aid provision and voting with China in
the UN General Assembly [UNGA],” he said.
“To give you a
sense of the magnitude of this effect, our statistical model indicates that a
10 per cent increase in UNGA voting similarity with China yields an 86 per cent
increase in Chinese aid, on average,” he said.
As an example, he
said, the model predicted that if Rwanda moved from its 67 per cent level of
voting alignment with China in the UN General Assembly to Egypt’s level – 93
per cent, the maximum level of UN voting alignment with China in their Africa
sample – it would see a 289 per cent increase in aid from China.
Conversely, if Egypt’s 93 per cent level of voting alignment with China in the UN General Assembly fell to Equatorial Guinea’s level (65 per cent), “our statistical model predicts that Egypt would see an 87 per cent reduction in aid from China”, Parks said.
-South China Morning Post
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